

ATLANTA, GA OCTOBER 11-14



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Security & Privacy

Enabling Encryption and Algorithm Revocation in Multi-Key Certificates

Massimiliano Pala

PKI Architectures Team, Director CableLabs









Outline

- Multi-Key Certificates
 - Composite Crypto Limitations
 - Two Separate Data Structures
- Encryption Support
 - Composite Keys encryption
 - Combined Keys encryption
- Key Configuration Revocation
 - Key Configurations as OID sequences
 - Revocation Extensions
- Conclusions

Multi-Key Certificates







Uncertainty and Crypto APIs

- When using multiple keys and error conditions are found, crypto libraries must have a clear indication of how to proceed
- Users and Crypto Libraries need indications about which algorithms are trusted and how to combine them together when signing and/or validating signatures

Multi-Key Certificates And Error Conditions





Multi-Key Certificates And Time







We need a practical way to provide deterministic crypto library behavior



An Incomplete Paradigm ?

- In its original formulation we did not provide clear semantics associated with Composite Crypto
- Crypto libraries must change their APIs to support new error cases and crypto-policies validations
- How to distribute these policies across millions of devices?
- Because of the lack of deterministic behavior, even encryption has been currently excluded from current multi-key certificate scope



Composite & Combined Cryptography

- Instead of providing complex policies and associated data structures, we introduce a new type of multi-key public keys
- Same structure as Composite Crypto (different OID)
- The new structures for Keys and Signatures are referred to as Combined Crypto (i.e., Combined Keys and Combined Signatures)
- While Composite Crypto is used to implement the "OR" logic function among the components, the Combined Crypto is used to implement the "AND" logic function



Composite Crypto

- When Signing, all Keys must be used to generate <u>independently</u> verifiable signatures
- When Validating a Composite Crypto signature, <u>ANY</u> of the individual signatures can be used to validate the signed data (OR)

Combined Crypto

- When Signing, ALL Keys that support signing must be used to generate (<u>NESTED</u> signatures?).
- When Validating a Combined Crypto signature, <u>ALL</u> the individual signature must be correctly validated (AND)

Multi-Key Certificates Signing







Not-Nested Signing with Combined Crypto

DATA TO BE SIGNED

(Certificate, CRL, OCSP Response, Generic Document, etc.)

Combined Signature

SignatureInfoRSA(data)

SignatureInfoECDSA (data|SignatureInfoRSA's value) Each Signature protects the **data** only, thus allowing for parallel signatures





Nested Signing with Combined Crypto



[*] prevents stripping when keys are not in a X.509 structure) $_{14}$



Enabling Encryption

- The use of Composite and Combined data structures also solves the ambiguity related to encryption and decryption
- We leverage the "OR" and "AND" logical operation to provide crypto libraries with deterministic behavior also for the Encryption processes
- A **Composite Key** is enabled for encryption if at least one of the components algorithms supports encryption.
- A **Combined Key** is enabled for encryption if all the components' algorithms support encryption.



Composite Crypto

- When Encrypting for a Composite Key, the encryption is performed with all the public keys <u>SEPARATELY</u>
- When **Decrypting** with a Composite Key, the decryption can be performed with <u>ANY</u> of the private keys related to the single public key components (OR)

Combined Crypto

- When **Encrypting**, for a Combined Key, the encryption is performed by using all the public keys <u>TOGETHER</u>
- When Decrypting with a Combined Key, the decryption must be performed using <u>ALL</u> the private keys components of the combined key (AND)



Encrypting with Composite Crypto





Nested Encrypting with Combined Crypto





Each subsequent Key in the Combined Key structure is used to encrypt the previous layer of protection in an "onion-like" encapsulation scheme



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Surviving Algorithms' Failures

- When using multiple algorithms inside Keys, Signatures, and Encrypted Data, some of these algorithms might face total failures (like for the RSA problem and the quantum-computing threat)
- A mechanism is needed to provide the relying parties that are validating multi-key signatures (but this applies also to single-key certificates) with the indication of which algorithms (or which algorithm combinations) are considered not valid anymore (within the CA)
- The Revocation System can be leveraged to deliver such information safely and when needed – i.e., during certificate validation and from a trusted entity (the Issuing CA)

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Algorithm Revocation







Matching Keys via Tree Searches

Combined Key OID + Composite Key OID + Falcon OID

We can address individual key configurations by using sequences of OIDs that crypto libraries can use to walk the key structure up to the specific key component.



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Conclusions

- Composite and Combined Crypto provide a complete definition of data structures and associated processing rules by implementing the "AND" and "OR" logic operations
- Different key configurations can be used in certificates to manage algorithm agility and algorithm failures over time.
- The structure of the public key provides clear authentication, validation, encryption, and decryption processing rules for crypto libraries
- CRLs and OCSP responses are used to carry sequences of OIDs (and validity periods) for individual key configuration revocation



ATLANTA, GA OCTOBER 11-14

Thank You!

Massimiliano Pala

PKI Architectures Team, Director CableLabs SCTE.

a subsidiary of CableLabs

m.pala@cablelabs.com

